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ARTICLES
ROBERT JACKSON’S CRITIQUE
OF TRUMP V. HAWAII
WILLIAM R. CASTO†
If the people ever let the command of the war power fall into
irresponsible and unscrupulous hands . . . .1
— Robert Jackson

I. INTRODUCTION
Over seventy years ago, United States Supreme Court Justice
Robert H. Jackson accurately predicted the Supreme Court’s
decision in Trump v. Hawaii.2 As he foresaw, the Court rubberstamped a President’s purposeful discrimination against a minority religion. This brief Essay explains Trump using Jackson’s
critique of judicial review in national-security cases.3 The Essay
also uses Trump to examine a flaw—probably structural—in the
constitutional theory of process jurisprudence.4 The Trump case
involved the Court’s construction of congressional legislation
apparently limiting the President’s authority, but the present
Essay does not address that aspect of the opinion.5
Jackson was a great Justice, who also served as chief United
States prosecutor at the Nuremburg Trials.6 Prior to joining the
Court, he served as President Franklin Roosevelt’s Attorney
General and advised the President on many complicated nationalsecurity issues.7 He had a detailed, thoughtful, and practical
†

Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, Texas Tech University.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
3
See infra notes 143–160 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 149–157 & 168–172 and accompanying text.
5
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408. The Court construed the statute in the President’s
favor and in doing so presumably was influenced by a desire not to limit the
President’s authority to protect the nation. Id.
6
See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 276 (2010). There is no good biography of Jackson.
7
See WILLIAM R. CASTO, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT: ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT
H. JACKSON AND FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 2 (2018).
1
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understanding of the intersection of law and national defense.
Based upon Jackson’s extensive experience, he believed that the
judiciary has a structural disability to assess national-security
issues, and that judges will typically rubber-stamp a President’s
purported national-security decision.8 In Korematsu v. United
States,9 the Court—over Jackson’s dissent—approved the President’s egregious misconduct. The Court has now done the same in
Trump.
A number of capable and thoughtful writers have vigorously
criticized the Trump decision.10 The present Essay, however, does
not condemn the Trump majority or its opinion. Rather, it focuses
in significant part on Jackson’s idea that courts are relatively
incompetent to review the lawfulness of national-security decisions, and that this blameless incompetence is a structural defect
in government under the Constitution. Jackson called it “the
Achilles Heel of our constitutional system.”11 If Jackson’s view is
accurate, the defect cannot be wholly corrected. Nevertheless, we
should strive to understand the nature of the problem, so that we
can realistically assess judicial decision-making in nationalsecurity cases.
As a matter of neutrally applicable constitutional principles,
the most disturbing aspect of the Trump Court’s decision is that
the Justices split along “party” lines. Five “Republican” Justices
voted to support a Republican President’s decision, and four “Democratic” Justices voted to overturn a Republican President’s decision.12 If the President had been a Democrat, perhaps some of the
Justices might have changed their vote.13 In the author’s mind,
8
Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: Justice Jackson
and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 459, 468.
9
323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of Japanese
internment camps during World War II).
10
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Trump v. Hawaii: “This President” and the National
Security Constitution, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Shalini Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power
and Animus in Immigration Law, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2019); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived
Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641 (2019).
11
Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 468.
12
The five Justices in the Trump majority were appointed by Republican
presidents. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/UKJ4-QYEY] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
Similarly, the four Trump dissenters were appointed by Democratic presidents. Id.
13
In Trump, five Justices appointed by Republican presidents showed immense
deference to a Republican President. See infra notes 148–155 and accompanying text;
see also Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576–77, 2596–97 (2019) (four
dissenting “Republican” Justices accept a Republican Administration’s position,
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Jackson’s explanation of the Trump decision is more persuasive
and certainly more attractive than the simplistic specter of raw
partisan politics.
The apparently partisan split also might be viewed as a matter
of conservative Justices deciding a case based upon conservative
principles and liberal Justices resorting to liberal principles.14 As
a matter of process jurisprudence, there can be no valid objection
to Justices resorting to their conservative or liberal principles in
legislating through adjudicating the law of the land. At the same
time, Trump illustrates a problem at the outer limits of process
jurisprudence.
Trump is best understood as turning on the influential concept of process jurisprudence, which for over a half century has
exerted an extraordinary influence upon sophisticated American
attorneys and judges.15 In judging seriously disputed matters, the
concept’s adherents try to factor out the substantive desirability
or propriety of the action under review.16 A central approach of
process jurisprudence is to defer to the government actor best
suited to decide the desirability or propriety of the action.17 This

which was based on an obvious falsehood), discussed infra in notes 161–171 and
accompanying text. More recently, the four “Republican” diehards did not even hint
at deferring to a Democratic President’s use of prosecutorial discretion to defer the
deportation of a class of individuals who were technically undocumented immigrants.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
14
In 2018, President Trump referred with disdain to an unwelcome judicial
opinion from the Ninth Circuit as having been written by an “Obama judge.” See
Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of “Obama Judge,” Chief Justice Roberts
Defends Judiciary as “Independent,” WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:21 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judgechief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-11e896d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html [https://perma.cc/QA2D-DUR8]. The President retorted, “Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges,’ and
they have a much different point of view than the people who are charged with the
safety of our country.” Id. If the President had judicial philosophy in mind, his retort
makes sense. One wonders, however, whether the retort was inspired by careful
consideration of judicial philosophy.
15
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of
The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2031, 2040 (1994) (identifying process
jurisprudence’s central texts as HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958)
and HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953)). See also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1959). These books “provided the agenda,
much of the analytic structure, and even the name of the ‘legal process school’ of the
1950s and the 1960s.” Eskridge & Frickey, supra, at 2031.
16
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15, at 2038.
17
Id.
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approach confers great discretion on the selected actor to reach the
best solution to a problem.
Process jurisprudence originated in the 1940s and 1950s as an
idea that would constrain conservative judges’ power to overturn
liberal programs created by Congress, the President, and administrative agencies.18 In recent decades, conservatives have sought to
enhance the power of Republican Presidents. Process jurisprudence now supports this conservative agenda.19
Process jurisprudence is primarily concerned with the judiciary and, as the name implies, addresses the process of judicial
decision-making and not the substance of specific principles or
rules created by judges. In particular, judicial decisions should
not be based upon some form of fact utilitarianism in which a judge
in each case strives to reach an ad hoc result by weighing and
balancing the interests of the specific parties and the facts of the
specific case. In Herbert Wechsler’s words, judicial decision-making
in any particular case should rest on “reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved.”20
In addition, process jurisprudence teaches that when a judge
is asked to review or enforce an act or action of another branch of
government, the judge should carefully consider whether the other
branch has a structural or political advantage in deciding the best
course of action. Ernest Young concisely encapsulated this idea:
“[L]aw should allocate decision[-]making to the institutions best
suited to decide particular questions, and . . . the decisions arrived
at by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in
the system, even if those actors would have reached a different
conclusion.”21
In Trump, the conservative majority resorted to process
jurisprudence to legitimize the President’s project to discriminate
against immigrants based upon their religion.22 At least, this

18

Id. at 2032–33.
For a recent analysis exploring the conservative/liberal flip-flop, see Jack M.
Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial
Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215, 216 (2019).
20
Wechsler, supra note 15, at 19.
21
Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54
DUKE L.J. 1143, 1149–50 (2005). Similarly, Professor Tushnet has suggested that
judicial deference to the more political branches accommodates the rampant pluralism
that dominates our society. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 13–14. One suspects, however,
that Professor Tushnet is not a firm disciple of process jurisprudence.
22
See infra notes 143–160 and accompanying text.
19
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rationale is the strongest argument in favor of the Trump decision.
The majority held that a President’s facially neutral policy whose
underlying purpose was to discriminate against a minority
religion was constitutional as long as the “policy is plausibly
related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the
country.”23 In other words, the Court will accept pretextual claims
regardless of a program’s actual purpose.
The Trump decision is easily explained in terms of Jackson’s
belief that courts are relatively incompetent to review nationalsecurity decisions.24 In addition and as a separate matter, Trump
highlights a defect in process jurisprudence—the concept’s Achilles
Heel, if you will. Process jurisprudence is based upon an implicit
assumption that government officers, more or less and with
significant room for disagreement, act in good faith. But what
should we do when a President acts in bad faith? This unfortunate
possibility presents a threshold question of whether President
Trump’s discrimination against a minority faith was or was not
actually the purpose of his policy. To put the matter differently,
we must decide whether the President’s avowed purpose was
pretextual and advanced in bad faith.
The issue of the President’s actual bad faith is factual, and in
the context of litigation, attorneys and law professors are quite
uncomfortable about resolving disputed issues of fact. That is for
the factfinders. Instead, we reflexively think in terms of what is
arguable. Moreover, anything is arguable. After a long career, a
highly respected law professor once concluded “[t]hat every
proposition is arguable.”25
As attorneys, we may think that everything is arguable. But
as human beings, we are quite willing to engage in factfinding
regarding a person’s good faith. All of us have encountered people
who lie to us on important issues. Most of us indulge a presumption of good faith, but we all understand that people sometimes lie. As a result, we sometimes pass judgment on the bona
fides of others. This unpleasant task is simply an inevitable aspect
of working with others. We may not like it, but we must do it.
The law has always recognized the sad fact of human mendacity. For example, in contract law, the issue of whether someone
has acted in actual bad faith occasionally arises. Reflecting the
23

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 115–134 and accompanying text.
25
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 192 (2007) (quoting former
Harvard Law professor Kingman Brewster).
24
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painful existence of human duplicity, factfinders are not required
to accept an individual’s self-serving claim of good faith. Rather,
a person’s good faith is routinely decided by reference to all the
surrounding circumstances.26
Part of the present Essay is based upon a factual determination that the President was consciously deceptive about the
immigration order.27 His purpose was to harm people based on
their religious faith, and his pretention of a national-security
concern unrelated to religion appears to be pretextual. There is
overwhelming evidence to conclude that the President acted in
subjective bad faith in enacting the travel ban.28 To repeat, this
aspect of the present Essay is not concerned with whether an
advocate could argue that the President acted in good faith—
anything is arguable. The real problem is what to do when we
conclude that a President is purposefully acting in bad faith—that
he is consciously practicing to deceive. What happens when the
President purports that his action stems from a national-security
purpose, but we seriously believe that it does not?
This horrible problem is not unique to judicial review. Some
members of the Trump Administration have also had to reconsider
their understanding of how Executive Branch officers generally
should act.29 Take the case of leaking, which invites the development of general guidelines regarding when it is appropriate to leak
and when it is not.30 Under general guidelines, the widespread
leaking of the Trump Administration is easily condemned.31 But
others justify this unusual amount of leaking because the current
President’s thoroughgoing mendacity is extraordinary, and
“[e]xtraordinary times demand extraordinary actions.”32 Similarly,
26

See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 440–42 (3d ed.
2004); 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 38:21 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2020).
27
See David J. Bier, A Dozen Times Trump Equated His Travel Ban with a
Muslim Ban, CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/
dozen-times-trump-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/8R73-K4EU].
28
See id.
29
See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Leaks: When to Spill Secrets,
FOREIGN AFFS., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 48, 48; Peter Feaver, The Secret Sharers: Leaking
and Whistle-Blowing in the Trump Era: Too Many Leaks, FOREIGN AFFS., Nov.–Dec.
2018, at 199, 200 (2018) (discussing the propriety of leaking in light of unique concerns
surrounding the Trump Administration).
30
See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 29; Feaver, supra note 29, at 199.
31
See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 29, at 199.
32
Allison Stanger, The Secret Sharers: Leaking and Whistle-Blowing in the
Trump Era: No Ordinary Times, FOREIGN AFFS., Nov.–Dec. 2018, at 202, 202 (2018)
(arguing that the Trump Administration’s “assault on the rule of law and the norms
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as a general proposition, members of the Executive Branch surely
should strive to support their President’s policies. Nevertheless,
an anonymous “senior official in the Trump [A]dministration” has
sincerely complained about the current President’s general
ineptitude and total amorality.33 The official has assured the
nation that “many of the senior officials in [Trump’s] own
administration are working diligently from within to frustrate
parts of his agenda and his worst inclinations.”34 There is ample
evidence to support the empirical claim that many senior officials
have actively sought to thwart the President’s agenda.35
The Trump case presented the judiciary with the same problem that has bedeviled some members of the Trump Administration. What should a person do when confronted with a President
who is acting in bad faith? What should the Court do about a
President who claims to be acting to defend the nation, but who
actually has an ulterior motive to harm members of a minority
religious faith? In regard to these questions, one of the most
respected jurists of the last century quipped that judges are “not
required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are
free.”36
In the President’s case, we know beyond dispute that he is an
inveterate prevaricator. Not just an occasional deceiver, but an
inveterate deceiver. The fact of his habitual, notorious, and widespread practice of not telling the truth about anything and
everything, large or small, is so well known that a judge easily
could and should take judicial notice of this dismaying and
engrained defect in his character.37 President Trump and his
representatives have claimed that his action against Muslim
immigrants stems from national-security necessity.38 There are
and practices of American democracy” justifies leaking that may not otherwise be
justified in other contexts).
33
Anonymous, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-houseanonymous-resistance.html [https://perma.cc/39YY-4GQ7].
34
Id. See generally ANONYMOUS, A WARNING (2019).
35
See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE, at xvii–xxii
(2018) (reporting examples of senior White House officials, among other things,
snatching documents from President Trump’s desk and talking him out of farfetched
foreign policy actions).
36
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2251, 2575 (2019) (quoting United States
v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977) (Friendly, J.)).
37
This engrained defect in President Trump’s character is “generally known” and
“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
38
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2436 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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ample grounds, however, to conclude that this claim is a sham.
Before the election, he shouted to the rooftops that he planned to
discriminate against Muslim immigrants based upon their religious
faith and did just that after the election.39 But at his direction, his
lawyers cleverly sought to disguise his discriminatory purpose by
using predominately Muslim countries as a proxy for the President’s underlying discriminatory purpose.40
Perhaps the President actually and sincerely believes that
faithful Muslims are inherently dangerous to our national security. If so, the President’s discrimination against Muslims would
be a good faith, albeit presumably unlawful,41 effort to protect us.
If he had stated that he was taking action because he had nationalsecurity concerns about the Islamic faith, his good faith could not
have been seriously questioned. His order, however, made no such
statement. Instead, he cleverly insisted that his concern was with
immigrants who coincidentally come from specific predominantly
Muslim countries. This clever pretextual reason was not given in
good faith. Its evident bad-faith purpose was to pretend that the
case did not present a direct conflict between discriminating
against a minority religion and securing the nation against harm.42
In real life, what do we do with someone who repeatedly promises that she will do something for a specific despicable reason and
then does just that? Obviously, all of us would assume that she
acted for the reason that she had so avidly avowed. But what do
we do if this person now claims that she has fulfilled her promise
for a non-despicable reason? Add to this predicament the fact that
the person is routinely untruthful. To be sure, her pretentions of
a non-despicable reason may as a matter of mathematical
possibility be true. But only a hopelessly naive person43 would
accept her pretextual pretenses.
The strongest justification for the Trump majority’s decision
comes from process jurisprudence.44 But process jurisprudence
implodes when government actors do not act in good faith. To use
39
Id. at 2435–36. The President’s shameful misconduct is briefly detailed in
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion. Id.
40
Id. at 2417 (majority opinion) (citing President Trump’s request to his advisors
to “legally” establish a Muslim ban).
41
See id. at 2423 (renouncing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding the internment of Japanese-Americans as constitutional)).
42
I thank my colleague Dustin Benham for this insight.
43
Or perhaps someone utterly and helplessly enthralled to the proposition that
anything is arguable. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
44
See infra notes 149–159 and accompanying text.
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Justice Jackson’s words, what happens when an “irresponsible
and unscrupulous” person45 is entrusted with the powers of the
presidency?
II. THE PRESIDENT’S PREROGATIVE POWER
Justice Jackson was a sophisticated, thoughtful, and pragmatic judge who had immense hands-on executive experience at
the highest levels of government. His concurring opinion in the
Steel Seizure Case46 has been regarded as “the greatest single
opinion ever written by a Supreme Court justice.”47 In foreign
policy and national defense cases, his opinion sets the stage for all
discussions of the Constitution’s allocation of powers between the
President and the Congress.
Another aspect of Steel Seizure has been less explored.
Jackson thought that the case implicated the President’s prerogative power to violate the law in order to achieve a national good.48
To put in bluntly, Jackson understood that the President has and
should have a political, though not legal, power to act unlawfully.49
In the Steel Seizure case, the President had unconstitutionally
seized the nation’s steel industry during the Korean War.50 When
the Justices discussed the case in conference, Justice Douglas
noted Jackson’s comment that the “President can throw Constitution overboard but we can’t.”51 At first glance, these words could
be dismissed as a “simple colloquial condemnation” of the President’s action.52 But Jackson meant what he said: he believed that
the President has a prerogative political power to disregard the
Constitution when facing complicated issues.53 Moreover, Jackson
believed that in some situations the President should do so.
45

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–55
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
47
Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded To Include The Insular
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 242 n.2
(2000).
48
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
49
Id. at 653–54 (“[I]t is relevant to note the gap that exists between the
President’s paper powers and his real powers.”).
50
See id. at 699–700 (Vinson, J., dissenting); see also MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN
AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (rev. ed. 1994)
for the best general description of the case. See also CASTO, supra note 7, at 83–109.
51
CASTO, supra note 7, at 101 (quoting Conference Notes, William O. Douglas,
Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct. (May 16, 1952) (on file with the William O. Douglas Papers at
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.)).
52
Id.
53
Id.
46
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During Jackson’s tenure in the Executive Branch, he saw
President Roosevelt throw the Constitution overboard more than
once. Based upon his direct personal experience, Jackson understood that Roosevelt “had a tendency to think in terms of right and
wrong, instead of terms of legal and illegal. Because he thought
that his motives were always good for the things that he wanted
to do, he found difficulty in thinking that there could be legal
limitations on them.”54
President Roosevelt’s relative disdain for legal restrictions
surfaced in his 1933 inaugural address, when the nation was in
the depths of the Great Depression. He warned the country that
“it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed
action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance
of public procedure.”55 Roosevelt quickly followed through with his
warning. In an effort to lead the nation out of the Depression, he
resolved to abandon the country’s gold standard for its currency.56
He believed that the resulting inflation would help the plight of
farmers and others by increasing the price of goods that they
sold.57 To accomplish his program of controlled inflation, he was
determined to devalue our currency.58 As a result, the farmers and
others would receive more dollars for their goods and services, and
they would have more dollars to pay their debts.
There was, however, a major impediment to the controlled
devaluation of the dollar. Almost all corporate bonds, government
bonds, mortgages, and other debt contracts called for payment in
dollars but included gold clauses keying payment to the dollar
value of gold rather than dollars.59 If the dollar were devalued, the
amount due under the gold clauses would increase dramatically,
which would impose great hardship on debtors.60 The federal government resolved this problem by voiding all these gold clauses.61
Of course, creditors immediately challenged the government’s
54

ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 74 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003). Similarly, in an impromptu eulogy on
Roosevelt’s death, Jackson remembered that the President “often was critical of our
[legal] profession, of its backward-looking tendencies, its preoccupation at times with
red tape to the injury of what he thought were more vital interests.” Id. at 168.
55
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933).
56
The story is well told in SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF FDR, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD 78 (2018).
57
Id. at xi.
58
Id. at 49.
59
Id. at 68–69.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 71.
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action and the litigation quickly reached the Supreme Court in the
Gold Clause Cases.62
Jackson closely consulted with the President on the gold
clause litigation. He later remembered that during oral argument
in the Court, “[s]ome very disturbing questions had been put to
[Attorney General Homer Cummings] and these the President
viewed as an indication that the devaluation policy might be held
unconstitutional . . . .”63 The President was deeply disturbed, and
in Jackson’s words, “[o]utright defiance of the Court was possible.”64
A true constitutional crisis was in the offing: “The President
was greatly concerned about the possible outcome of that case and
was quite determined that he just could not accept an adverse
decision.”65 Roosevelt considered various approaches, including
outright public defiance of the Court.
The President told others that he had actually drafted a “radio
speech to be given on the night of the day the [C]ourt hands down
the decision.”66 In the speech, Roosevelt described the dire consequences that would flow from a Supreme Court decision enforcing
the gold clauses.67 He also clearly stated that in this event he
would not abide by the Court’s decision. In his planned radio
address, Roosevelt planned to say:
[The Justices] have decided these cases in accordance with the
letter of the law as they saw it. It is nevertheless my duty to
protect the people of the United States to the best of my ability.
To carry through the decision of the Court to its logical and
inescapable end will so endanger the people of this Nation that I
am compelled to look beyond the letter of the law to the spirit of
the original contracts.68

Fortunately, the Court ruled five to four in the President’s favor69
and thereby averted the crisis.

62
Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 291 (1935); Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317, 324 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935).
63
JACKSON, supra note 54, at 65.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
EDWARDS, supra note 56, at 167 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt).
67
See id. at 167–69.
68
JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT 99 (2010) (quoting the president’s draft).
69
See EDWARDS, supra note 56, at 172. Given the sui generis political context, the
Gold Clause Cases are almost never studied in Constitutional Law and almost never
mentioned.
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A few years later, the President wished to build a modern
airport for the nation’s capital, but Congress was hopelessly
“bogged down.”70 “The situation was ridiculous.”71 In Jackson’s
words, the national airport “consisted of a pasture intersected by
a highway. When a plane came in, they had to close the road to
traffic and open it again after the plane had landed.”72 “[T]he
President was pretty much disgusted.”73 Congress had not appropriated funds specifically for an airport, but the Public Works
Administration (“PWA”) and the Work’s Progress Administration
(“WPA”) had enough money to commence construction.74 Roosevelt told Jackson, “Bob, I want you to get [the WPA and the PWA
together] at once and knock their heads together until you get that
money knocked out of them.”75 Jackson did so, and groundbreaking quickly commenced on the National, now Reagan, Airport.76
Unfortunately, the President’s action was blatantly unconstitutional,77 and Jackson knew so. He later described the episode
as “an instance in which . . . the President act[ed] beyond the
Constitution.”78 Jackson had no qualms about this flagrant violation, which he viewed as a benign transgression, because the
construction “invade[d] no private right and . . . took nobody’s
property.”79 Moreover, he noted that but for “that Presidential
initiative, Washington probably would have faced World War II
without an adequate airport.”80 We see the technical issue in the
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See CASTO, supra note 7, at 22–24.
Id.
72
JACKSON, supra note 54, at 47.
73
Id.
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Id. at 47–48.
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Id. at 48.
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Id.
77
See Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The
Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1998). A
fundamental clause of the Constitution provides, “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 7. Moreover, an old statute, still in effect today, outlawed the expenditure of
funds without an authorizing appropriation. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018), amended by
Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-5 § 103, 133
Stat. 11 (codifying a provision of the Anti-Deficiency Act, originally passed in 1870).
In Jackson’s words, Roosevelt acted to expend funds “without congressional
authorization or appropriation.” JACKSON, supra note 54, at 48.
78
JACKSON, supra note 54, at 48.
79
Id.
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Id.
71
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National Airport episode repeated in President Trump’s search for
funds to construct his border wall.81
The National Airport episode is hardly significant. In fact,
Jackson joked with the President about it.82 A far more serious
problem arose two years later. An act of Congress made government wiretapping illegal, and Jackson so advised the President.83
Nevertheless, Roosevelt directed Jackson to institute a program of
illegal wiretapping.84 Jackson never changed his mind about the
program’s illegality, but he complied with the President’s directive.85 Although the President violated a statute, his misconduct
also had a significant constitutional dimension. Under the constitutional doctrine of legislative supremacy,86 a President is bound
to follow an otherwise constitutional statute. Jackson’s acquiescence in the President’s lawlessness was the basis for many
decades of widespread intrusion into Americans’ privacy.87
Roosevelt’s next unlawful action involved aiding Great Britain
in its battle with Nazi Germany.88 At the time, the United States
had not entered the war, and Britain stood alone against the Nazi
Colossus. We were neutral, but the President correctly viewed the
beleaguered British as America’s first line of defense against the
Nazis. To assist the British, the President decided to sell them
fifty old destroyers.89 The sale was technically illegal because it
encroached upon the Congress’s plenary constitutional power to
control the disposal of federal property,90 but the President carried

81
See Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 2019); see also infra notes
158–160 and accompanying text.
82
JACKSON, supra note 54, at 48. In a jocular mood, the President “asked
[Jackson] if he was likely to go to jail as a result . . . .” Id. Jackson quipped back, “I
told him all that I could promise was to go to jail with him . . . .” Id.
83
See CASTO, supra note 7, at 29, 45. At this time, the Constitution placed no
limits on wiretapping. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–65 (1928).
84
See CASTO, supra note 7, at 38.
85
See id.
86
English-speaking countries have followed this fundamental constitutional
principle since Parliament beheaded Charles I in 1649. Louis J. Sirico Jr., The Trial
of Charles I: A Sesquitricentennial Reflection, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 52 (1999).
87
See Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1413 (2010); CASTO, supra note 7, at 45–
46.
88
See CASTO, supra note 7, at 66–70.
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Id. at 59–60, 66–67, 69.
90
Id. at 62.
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it out anyway. Attorney General Jackson published an official
opinion supporting Roosevelt’s unlawful action.91
III. THE RIDDLE OF EX PARTE MERRYMAN
For the last fifteen years of his life, Jackson struggled to solve
the riddle of the judiciary’s role when the President violates the
Constitution in a national-defense context.92 He never found an
answer. Initially, he thought that the courts should strive to avoid
judicial review of unconstitutional presidential misconduct.93 But,
as a practical matter, this idea turned out to be unworkable.
For Jackson, the Civil War case of Ex parte Merryman94 was
the paradigm for national-security conflicts between the President
and the judiciary. He was thinking about Merryman as early as
1940, when he wrote a book on the proper role of the Supreme
Court in our society.95 At the beginning of the Civil War, when
Congress was not in session, President Abraham Lincoln authorized his generals to take vigorous action against people they
suspected of being disloyal to the Union.96 In Jackson’s words, the
Lincoln administration “resorted to wholesale arrests without
warrants, detention without trial, and imprisonment without
judicial conviction.”97 At the same time, the President unilaterally
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.98
Following President Lincoln’s directive, the Union army
arrested Maryland resident John Merryman, who later sought a
writ of habeas corpus from Chief Justice Roger Taney of the
Supreme Court.99 Taney ruled that the President lacked unilateral constitutional authority to suspend the writ and ordered

91
See Op. on Exch. of Over-Age Destroyers for Naval and Air Bases, 39 Op. Att’y
Gen. 484 (1940).
92
See infra notes 94–114 and accompanying text.
93
Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFFALO L.
REV. 103, 116 (1951).
94
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
95
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 324–27 (1941).
96
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147–48.
97
Jackson, supra note 93, at 109.
98
Id.
99
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147. Taney was sitting on a lower court, as many
sitting Supreme Court Justices did at the time. Id.
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Merryman’s release.100 The army, however, refused to comply with
the Chief Justice’s order.101
When Jackson first considered the Lincoln/Taney riddle in
1940, he was Attorney General, and he was sympathetic to Chief
Justice Taney’s plight.102 But Jackson ventured no opinion on the
merits of the conflict.103 He returned to the riddle a few years later
when he was a Supreme Court Justice. This time he was considering President Roosevelt’s egregious mistreatment of our JapaneseAmerican citizens on the West Coast.104
In Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court considered a
curfew applicable only to people of Japanese ancestry.105 The case
was a precursor to the President’s infamous imprisonment of innocent Japanese-American citizens. Jackson believed that discrimination based solely upon a person’s ancestry was unconstitutional,
but he was leery of reviewing a wartime military order. In a
lengthy footnote to an unpublished draft opinion, he returned to
the Lincoln/Taney paradigm.106 He concluded: “I do not know that
the ultimate cause of liberty has suffered, and it may have been
saved by [Lincoln’s] questionable arrests. I am sure the cause [of
liberty] would have suffered if this Court had rationalized [the
arrests] as Constitutional.”107 After much discussion, his fellow
Justices convinced him to concur without opinion in a decision
allowing the curfew to stand.108
In 1951, Jackson returned to the Lincoln/Taney paradigm in
a speech on “Wartime Security and Liberty under Law.”109 The
problem continued to perplex him. There was no clear solution
because the problem turned upon “two rights, each in its own way
important.”110 Our citizens have an expectation to be free from
foreign attack, and they have an expectation that their civil
100

Id. at 149.
JACKSON, supra note 95, at 324 (“An aide-de-camp in full military uniform and
appropriately wearing a sword, appeared and declined obedience to the ancient writ
of freedom . . . .”).
102
Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 467.
103
Id.
104
See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
105
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at, 88–89.
106
Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 474 n.9.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 466–67. Jackson viewed the curfew as relatively minor and thought that
the Court’s Hirabayashi decision would not foreclose a later de novo consideration of
the imprisonment (internment) program. Id.
109
Jackson, supra note 93, at 103.
110
Id. at 117.
101
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liberties will be preserved.111 The Lincoln/Taney paradigm presented this dilemma, and Jackson said, “if logic supports Taney,
history vindicates Lincoln.”112
Finally, at the very end of his life, he once more took up the
Lincoln/Taney riddle and still could find no satisfactory answer.113
He again concluded that history—but not law—vindicated
Lincoln: “Had Mr. Lincoln scrupulously observed Taney’s policy, I
do not know whether we would have had any liberty, and had the
Chief Justice adopted Mr. Lincoln’s philosophy as the philosophy
of the law, I again do not know whether we could have had any
liberty.”114 In a sense, Jackson was content with the ultimate
outcome. Lincoln defended the nation, and Taney the law.
IV. THE JUDICIARY’S STRUCTURAL INCOMPETENCE
Jackson believed that any judicial attempt to review nationalsecurity or military decisions would always be inherently flawed.
He believed that “[i]n the very nature of things military decisions
are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal.”115 In addition,
serious evidentiary problems typically preclude judges from even
considering much of the most pertinent evidence regarding these
decisions, rendering them incompetent to weigh and balance
relevant factors.
In Korematsu v. United States, Jackson finally had to confront
this structural defect when hearing a challenge to the government’s internment of Japanese-American citizens.116 He noted the
paucity of evidence on the fundamental issue of whether the
internment order had “a reasonable basis in necessity.”117 There
simply was “[n]o evidence whatever on that subject . . . taken by
this or any other court.”118 All the Court had was a general’s
“unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any crossexamination.”119 Jackson’s concern about the paucity of evidence
was entirely justified: over sixty years later, the Solicitor General
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Id.
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ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 76 (1955) (published posthumously).
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Id.
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 215–16 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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of the United States confessed error in his predecessor’s concealment of information in Korematsu that drastically undercut the
government’s case.120
Jackson believed that lack of evidence would be the typical
situation. National-security and military orders frequently would
be based on information not “admissible and on assumptions that
could not be proved.”121 The information might be confidential and
“could not be disclosed to courts without danger that it would
reach the enemy.”122 Given these practical realities, “courts can
never have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration
of the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably
necessary from a military [or national-security] viewpoint.”123
Even if the pertinent evidence were available, the judiciary
would remain incompetent to gauge the reasonableness of a
national-security decision. In Jackson’s mind, the “very essence of
the military job is to [gain] every strategic advantage.”124 He
continued, “[n]o court can require such a commander in such
circumstances to act as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably
cautious and exacting.”125 Thus in Korematsu, the commander
may have been “unreasonably cautious and exacting” in sweeping
up all of our Japanese-American citizens in order to isolate just a
few potential spies.126 On issues of national security, you do not
take chances. Echoing his thoughts on the Lincoln/Taney riddle,
Jackson conceded that as a matter of military, but not constitutional

120

When Roosevelt’s Solicitor General argued Korematsu to the Court, he knew of
and suppressed an Office of Naval Intelligence report, which said that “only a small percentage of Japanese Americans posed a potential security threat, and that the most dangerous were already known or in custody.” Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, DEP’T OF JUST.
(May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitorgenerals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/AS3KXMJB]. In addition, “a key set of allegations used to justify the internment [was] that
Japanese Americans were using radio transmitters to communicate with enemy
submarines off the West Coast . . . .” Id. Roosevelt’s Solicitor General knew that these
allegations “had been discredited by the FBI and FCC,” but the Solicitor General
concealed the FBI and FCC conclusions. Id.
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Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Id.
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Id. In Korematsu, the information presumably would have been based upon
the government’s actual knowledge of specific security threats posed by specific
individuals. Jackson also noted that the courts could not “act on communications made
in confidence.” Id.
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Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
125
Id.
126
Id.
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analysis, “[p]erhaps [a commander] should be” “unreasonably cautious and exacting.”127
Jackson thought that the gravest threat to our constitutional
order in national-security cases was the clear possibility that the
Court would rubber-stamp national-security decisions—in other
words, would rationalize them as lawful.128 This approach would
turn the entire matter over to the political wisdom and judgment
of the President. In effect, this is precisely what happened in
Korematsu and Trump: the Court in both cases approved the
President’s egregious misconduct. Because the Court in these
cases likely would accept any President’s national-security
rationale, Jackson concluded that as a practical matter, “[t]he
chief restraint upon [executive abuse of power] must be [the
Executive’s] responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.”129 He
might have added that the President’s personal judgment would
serve as an important third check.
In Jackson’s mind, the ultimate nightmare would come to pass
“[i]f the people ever let command of the war power fall into
irresponsible and unscrupulous hands.”130 President Roosevelt’s
lawlessness, however, did not seriously concern Jackson. He absolutely trusted Roosevelt’s personal judgement. In the words of a
careful and capable student of Jackson’s life, Roosevelt was
Jackson’s “hero, friend, and leader.”131
Jackson never solved the puzzle of the Lincoln/Taney paradigm.
In Korematsu, he feared that the Court’s opinion would “lie[ ]
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”132
Moreover, he feared that the opinion would inevitably metastasize
beyond its original limits. Quoting Benjamin Cardozo, Jackson
noted “[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of
its logic.”133
Jackson thought that the judiciary perhaps could avoid the
puzzle’s irreconcilable conflict by simply abstaining from reviewing national-security decisions. But in his lifetime, abstention
127
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proved to be unworkable. His idea only works if the other Justices
cooperate. They did not do so.134
If we fully embrace Jackson’s analysis, we must understand
that his thinking was not ad hominem. He did not believe that his
fellow Justices were recklessly conspiring to exult presidential
power. Felix Frankfurter, his best friend on the Court, voted to
approve Korematsu’s imprisonment. Rather, Jackson believed that
his brethren were acting under a structural disability. They
simply could not bring themselves to overturn a President’s
purported national-security decision.
Finally, Jackson understood that the serious problem of
judicial competence was not absolute. In Korematsu, three
Justices, including Jackson, voted to invalidate the government’s
unconstitutional program of imprisonment, and in Trump, four
Justices refused to abide by the President’s misconduct.135
Jackson’s analysis of judicial incompetence is best viewed as a
significant factor that will weigh heavily in judges’ decisions.
Jackson never answered the Lincoln/Taney riddle to his
satisfaction. Instead he resorted to ad hoc solutions. He voted to
overturn a President’s national-security program in two highprofile cases.136 His case-by-case approach suggests a pragmatic
method for working around the judiciary’s national-security
incompetence.
In Korematsu, Jackson completely avoided the factual issue of
whether the President’s imprisonment program was wise or even
134

For detailed analyses of Jackson’s preferred approach to interfering with a
President’s military or national-security decision, see Hutchinson, supra note 8, at
458–59, and CASTO, supra note 7, at 101–09. Jackson believed that the judiciary
should show great deference to the President and that the remedy of habeas corpus
should not be used to interfere with a President’s national-security action. He
conceded that under his preferred approach, Chief Justice Taney should not have
challenged Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Jackson, supra note 93.
He viewed the Korematsu case differently, because the courts could not abstain from
a decision when the President had invoked the judicial process in a criminal
prosecution. Id. at 115.
Eugene Rostow excoriated Jackson’s Korematsu opinion as “a fascinating and
fantastic essay in nihilism.” Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 510 (1945). As a practical matter, however, Jackson’s
abstention theory is quite unworkable. His theory does not work if the other Justices
decide to address the merits. The abstaining Justice would simply be a Lone Ranger
riding his “abstention hobby-horse.” CASTO, supra note 7, at 108–09.
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See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (including dissenting opinions from
Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)
(referencing the four Justices in dissent: Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg).
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See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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needed.137 Instead, he concluded as a matter of law that the Constitution limited Roosevelt’s authority to protect our national
security. Regardless of need or necessity, Jackson decided that the
Constitution does not permit the federal government to imprison
people based solely on their parentage.138
Jackson used the same approach in the Steel Seizure case.139
During the Korean War, President Truman declared a nationalsecurity emergency and seized the nation’s steel industry.140 There
was a possible factual issue of whether there actually was an
emergency. In oral argument, however, Jackson plainly stated
“[i]t is not our business to decide what is an emergency.”141
Instead, he ruled as a matter of the law and without regard to
national-security need or necessity that the President lacked
authority to seize the steel mills.142 He believed that Congress had
effectively removed the seizure power from the President’s hands.
In Korematsu and Steel Seizure, Jackson never questioned the
President’s judgment regarding the need for the national-security
program. Instead, he believed that as a matter of law, the President lacked authority to implement the two programs. In
Korematsu the Constitution preempted the President’s decision,
and in Steel Seizure Congress did the same.
V. TRUMP
The factual background to the Trump case is well known and
need not be rehearsed in any detail. During Trump’s presidential
campaign, he promised to discriminate against Muslim immigrants based upon their religion if elected.143 After his election, he
issued a series of executive orders that fulfilled his promise.144 As
a technical matter, the President’s orders did not single out
Muslims. Rather, he singled out immigrants from several predominantly Muslim countries.145
137

See supra notes 116–134 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 2436–39.
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Trump is a realization of Jackson’s predictions in Korematsu.
The Justices—at least the majority—viewed themselves as incompetent to second-guess the President on a decision that the
President claimed was based upon national-security concerns. As
Jackson predicted, the government refused to offer any evidence
regarding the claimed underlying national-security threat. For
example, the majority noted that the proclamation establishing
the discriminatory program explained that all reasons for issuing
the order could not be made public: “Describing all of those reasons
publicly, however, would cause serious damage to the national
security of the United States . . . .”146
Jackson viewed the concern about national security as a factor
that might unconsciously influence a judge’s decision. Surely,
national-security concerns exert an invisible gravitational pull in
the judicial process. In Korematsu, Jackson refused to “distort the
Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient,”
and worried that “the Court appear[ed] to be doing [so], whether
consciously or not.”147 In Trump, the majority consciously bowed
before the President’s national-security claims. The majority
frankly stated, “ ‘[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing inferences’ on questions of national security, ‘the lack of
competence on the part of the courts is marked.’ ”148
The five Justices in the majority were aware of the elephant
in the room, and presumably understood that the President’s
purpose in enacting the travel ban was to cleverly discriminate
against a minority religious faith. They knew that one of his
senior advisors had explained that the President asked him in
private to “[p]ut a commission together” to “legally” assemble a
Muslim ban.149 The majority tried to dance around that elephant
by accusing the dissenters of using a reasonable-person standard,
one that would empower the judiciary to overturn a nationalterrorists entering our country through the ordinary immigration system? In any
event, there already is an order excluding North Korean nationals. See Exec. Order
No. 13,810, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,705, 44,707–08 (Sept. 20, 2017); Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2442
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The President’s inclusion of Venezuelan immigrants is
also pretextual. Only a few Venezuelan officials and their immediate families are
barred from entry. See id.
146
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,165 (Sept. 24, 2017), quoted in
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2409 n.2.
147
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244–45 (1944).
148
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. 1, 34 (2010)).
149
Id. at 2417 (quoting a Trump advisor recalling his discussions with the
President).

356

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:335

security decision based upon judges’ independent evaluations of
reasonableness.150 This supposed reasonable-person standard,
however, is a strawman because the President was guilty under
any known standard of judicial factfinding. The most stringent
standard for making factual determinations is “beyond a reasonable doubt,” where the factfinder must be in a “ ‘subjective state of
near certitude’ of [a criminal] defendant’s guilt.”151 Even under
this most stringent standard, the evidence in Trump easily
established presidential guilt.152
The President’s misconduct in this case is the ultimate nightmare for process jurisprudence. In terms of decision-making on
national-security issues, the courts have demonstrated a lack of
competence.153 Moreover, process jurisprudence demands that
judges eschew ad hoc decision-making and premise decisions on
neutral principles that “transcend any immediate result that is
involved” and would also apply to future cases.154 A basis for
overturning the President’s decision must be equally applicable to
the judicial review of future Presidents’ national-security actions.
Being capable human beings, the majority fully understood
that the President’s facially neutral proclamation was pretextual.
The President’s obvious purpose was to discriminate against a
minority religion. In a single sentence buried in the middle of its
opinion, the majority candidly explained “we must consider not
150

Id. at 2420 n.5.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7 (8th ed. 2018) (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)).
152
Suppose, for example, that a private person had a lengthy history—comparable
to President Trump’s—of expressing personal animus towards Muslims in general,
and like the President, she had vowed to harm Muslims. Suppose also that, unlike
President Trump, the private person had gone to a part of town that she knew to be
predominantly Muslim, entered a Muslim store, and randomly committed crimes
against the people that she encountered. She is then indicted on a number of counts,
including hate crimes. The applicable hate-crime statute applies only when the
accused’s actions are motivated by an animus to harm persons based upon their
religion. At the trial, the defendant insists that her purpose was not to harm Muslims
specifically—that she was simply trying to harm persons on a random basis. Let us
also assume that the prosecution impeaches the defendant’s testimony with an
avalanche of proof that the defendant, like President Trump, is an inveterate liar.
If you, the reader of the present Essay, were on the jury, would you—in your heart
of hearts—decide that, contrary to the defendant’s pretentions, her purpose was to
harm Muslims?
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only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself.”155 The majority appeared to be
worried about creating a rule that would hamper a future
President’s good-faith efforts to protect our national security. It
apparently wished to create a standard that would generally bar
judicial review of future presidential actions. A standard that requires factfinding would require a trial. In contrast, the majority’s
standard merely requires a judge to conjure a hypothetically
legitimate purpose regardless of the President’s actual purpose.
This standard will facilitate pretrial motions to dismiss or grants
of summary judgment.
Some commentators have rejected the Trump majority’s
extreme deference and have argued for more skepticism, more
searching scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and other similar approaches.156 These sensible proposals, however, do not address the
Trump majority’s overriding concern to guard future Presidents’
national-security decisions. All of these approaches would involve
more extensive judicial review of national-security measures.
Those who are so inclined might tease possible limitations out
of the Trump Court’s decision. The Court stated and restated that
their review is limited to “whether the Executive gave a ‘facially
legitimate and bona fide’ reason for its action.”157 Perhaps a
facially legitimate presidential decision taken in bad faith would
be subject to a more stringent review. The apparent requirement
of good faith, however, must be dismissed as mere window
dressing. Whether someone has acted in good faith is a factual
issue to be determined by the entire context of the action under
review. The Trump case involved the strongest possible evidence
of presidential bad faith. If this evidence of bad faith does not
suffice, there can be no realistic situation in which the Trump
majority would hold a President not to have acted in good faith.158
Jackson’s opinions in Korematsu and the Steel Seizure case
suggest a way of working around the Justices’ understandable reluctance to second-guess a President’s national-security decision.
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In each case, Jackson concluded as a matter of law that presidential authority to protect our national security had been
removed from the presidency’s hands. Perhaps the best way to
deal with difficult factual issues like motivation, need, and
necessity is to consider whether a President has the legal authority to take a particular action. For example, when the
President’s need for funds to construct a border wall comes to the
Supreme Court, the better part of valor will be to avoid factual
issues. A better legal argument would be that, in respect to the
availability of funds, Congress has carefully and fully considered
the need for a wall.159 The upshot is that Congress—not the
President and certainly not the judiciary—has decided that a wall
is unnecessary and that therefore Congress refused to make the
necessary appropriations. This analysis is fully supported by the
well-established constitutional doctrine that Congress has plenary
power over expenditures of federal funds.160
VI. THE CENSUS CASE
The problem of blatant misrepresentation arose again in
Department of Commerce v. New York, which involved the administration’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020
census.161 The state of New York challenged this question on
grounds that it would undercount noncitizen and Hispanic households, a move that arguably would give Republicans a structural
electoral advantage.162 The administration defended the question
as needed to enforce the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), but the
evidence established that this bizarre claim was pretextual.163
Therefore the Court was left with a raw decision unsupported by
any reason whatsoever.
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2551 (No. 18-966), 2019 WL 1468270, at *1; see also Letter Brief for Plaintiff N.Y.
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Brief for Government Respondents at 54, Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551 (No.
18-966), 2019 WL 1468270, at *54.
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In the Census Case, Chief Justice Roberts gagged on the
administration’s falsehoods. He began by noting that “the VRA
enforcement rationale—the sole stated reason [for the question]—
seems to have been contrived.”164 He then noted that the administration’s justifications were “incongruent with what the record
reveal[ed]”; highlighted “the disconnect between the decision made
and the explanation given”; declared the Department’s explanation
“a distraction”; and concluded that “[a]ccepting contrived reasons
would defeat the purpose of the [administrative] enterprise.”165
The Chief Justice noted that “[o]ur review [of agency action]
is deferential, but we are ‘not required to exhibit a naivete from
which ordinary citizens are free.’ ”166 Notwithstanding the Chief
Justice’s allusion to naiveté, four Justices—three from the erstwhile Trump majority—did not gag on the administration’s deceit.
In the words of a famous Victorian, the dissenters essentially said,
“[p]lease, sir, [we] want some more.”167
The four dissenters in the Census Case obviously are not naïve
jurists. They thought that the Chief Justice’s conclusion was “extraordinary,”168 which it was. But they studiously avoided considering whether the administration in fact misrepresented the
reason for its action.
The dissenters could not find their way out of a dark cul-desac at the outer limits of process jurisprudence. Several protested
that the majority opinion “opened a Pandora’s box of pretext-based
challenges in administrative law.”169 In the alternative, several
wrote “[h]opefully [the majority decision] comes to be understood
as an aberration—a ticket good for this day and this train only.”170
Presumably, the dissenters hope that the majority opinion
will be ignored as a sport or aberration with no precedential value.
If so, the decision is a function of ad hoc, unprincipled analysis.
This violates one of the central tenets of process jurisprudence. In
164
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Id. at 2583; accord id. at 2605 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[W]idespread judicial
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practical consequences.’ ”).
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Id. at 2584 (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord id. at 2597 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[T]oday’s decision is either an aberration or a license for widespread judicial inquiry
into the motivations of Executive Branch officials.”).
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Herbert Wechsler’s words, judicial decisions should rest on
“reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved.”171
For the dissenters, the worst-case scenario is that the
majority’s decision is based upon general and neutral principles
that transcend the immediate result. This scenario would save the
decision from unprincipled decision-making but would run squarely into another key tenet of process jurisprudence. There can be
no doubt that administrative matters like framing the census are
best done by the Executive Branch—not the judiciary. The dissenters were likely worried that the majority opinion would usher
in a new era in which the judiciary would constantly be secondguessing the Executive’s administrative decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our “irresponsible and unscrupulous” President was a nightmare for those—like the present author—who still believe in
process jurisprudence.172 Hopefully Trump’s precedential value
will be limited to national-security cases. When Chief Justice
Roberts called foul in the Census Case, he was not reviewing a
national-security decision.
Trump is technically distinguishable from most nationalsecurity cases that are likely to arise in the future. Perhaps
Trump applies only to immigration cases that do not involve the
individual rights of one of our citizens or of an alien lawfully
present in the United States. On the other hand, if Justice
Jackson is right, the majority’s action should be read as a simple
rubber-stamping of a President’s pretended national-security
decision. Under this reading of the Court’s opinion, the next
controversial national-security case will again result in a majority
of the Justices blindly accepting a President’s decision and
perhaps identifying some new set of convenient limiting or
distinguishing factors.
The Court’s structural incompetence to review nationalsecurity actions will significantly enhance the judicial inclination
to expand principles to the limits of their logic.173 We may safely
predict that Trump will become an integral part of the government’s future defense of all national-security actions. The opinion
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will lie around “like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of . . . urgent
need.”174 Indeed, the government’s brief in Trump argued that the
President’s overriding national-security power should extend to
domestic action that seems to violate the Constitution.175
The practical limits of the Trump decision are a function of
the Court’s willingness to bow before a national-security President. The ultimate problem for the Trump majority is how far they
should push their entirely legitimate, process-jurisprudence
concerns about future Presidents’ constitutional authority. To
repeat, the Trump presidency was a nightmare for those of us who
still cleave to process jurisprudence.
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